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XX. THE TERM. "COMMUNAL"

I. THE DOCTRINE OF COMMUNAL ORIGINS
The period following the French Revolution was deeply
interested in "the people" as a mass conception, in all that
belonged to them and all that they created. It was in this

period that theorists on the origin of law, customs, religion,
language, literature-particularly the folk-song and the folk-

tale-liked to advocate the doctrine of spontaneous, unconscious
growth "from the heart of the people," as the phrase went.
Such conceptions of origin had their critics from the first;
but they remained more or less orthodox throughout the nineteenth century, and they still have foothold in both England
and Ameiica. They have, however, receded in the wake of
more reserved second-thoughts about human nature, along
with the recession of the "romantic" vehemence, and of the
Hegelian philosophy of the "over-soul," and of our own demagogic admiration of the undifferentiated demos.
In law, for a first illustration, the theory of the German

jurist, Friedrich Karl von Savigny (1779-1861) remained entrenched pretty much throughout the century. Savigny's
theory may be summarized in a few sentences:'
Yet we are not at all to think of it [the common la,w] as such in the sense
that the several individuals who compose the people have produced it by an
exercise of their will; for this will of the individuals might perhaps sometimes
bring forth the same law but might also, perhaps, and with more likelihood
bring forth very diverse laws. It is rather the spirit of the people [Volksgeist]
living and working in all individuals that gives rise to the positive law; which,
therefore is not a matter of chance for the consciousness of each individual but

is necessarily one and the same law for each . . . This feeling [of the internal

necessity which goes with the recognition of positive law] is expressed with
most positiveness in the ancient assertion of a divine origin for law or for
enactments; for one could not conceive of a more distinct denial that law originates by chance or through human will.

In other words, law is something that grows by sheer power
of unfolding itself in men's miscegenated conscious states.

About 1878 R. von Ihering attacked this doctrine with his
theory of law as a conscious product of men seeking to achieve
I System des h6utigen rdmischen Rechts (1840), I, ? 7.
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social ends, and Savigny's theory was gradually dropped in
continental Europe. By the end of the nineteenth century, it
was practically given up everywhere except in England and
America.

A further illustration may be drawn from the history of
theories concerning the origin and growth of language. Jacob
Grimm thought of language as something born from the soul of
primitive society. Savigny was Grimm's teacher, and as laws
were to Savigny, so language was to Grimm, unmistakably of
social emergence. His successors retained this view of language
as a social product, though they offered explanations of the
sources of human speech which were more concrete than
Grimm's. A distinction, deriving from Grimm's view, arose
between the "artificial" products of the individual and the
spontaneous creation of the people. Professor Paul was a

dissenter.2 He emphasized the part played by the individual,
and believed in an artistic rather than a social genesis for
language. In the main, however, language continued to be
viewed, as it was by the psychologist Wundt, as a product of
the communal mind. Characteristic is the position of an
American scholar, writing as late as 1891, in advocacy of "The
Festal Origins of Human Speech." The psychologist, he says3:
. . .can trace the root back to the rhythmic sounds that savages produce
when they beat sonorous bodies amid the play-excitement which originated
through communal elation of the success of communal action, and which had
become, at the earliest glimpse which we obtain of it, involved, like the oldest
and most sacred of the words it gave birth to, in the race's traditional custom
of festal celebration.

At the opposite extreme from these theories is the view of

Professor Otto Jespersen. He suggests in his recently published
Language (1922)4 that:
[The first utterances were] exclamative, not communicative-that is, they
came forth from an inner craving of the individual without any thought of any

fellow creatures. Our remote ancestors had not the slightest notion that such
a thing as communicating ideas and feelings to some one else was possible . .
Although we now regard the communication of thought as the main object of

speaking, there is no reason for thinking that this has always been the case;
it is perfectly possible that speech has developed from something which had no
2 Principien der Spralchgeschichte (1886), ch. i.
3 J. Donovan, Mind, vol. VI, pp. 498-506.

4 See pp. 432-442. See also his earlier Progress in Language (1894).
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other purpose than that of exercising the muscles of the mouth and throat and
of amusing oneself and others by the production of pleasant or possibly only
strange sounds.

The first utterances of speech he fancies to himself as

"something between the nightly love-lyrics of puss upon the
tiles and the melodious love songs of the nightingale," i.e., he

puts forward a doctrine which is neither "festal" nor "communal."5 He also points out that to ensure the creation of a
speech which shall be a parent to a new language stock, all

that is needed is that two or more children should be placed by
themselves in a condition where they will be entirely or to a

large degree free from the presence or influence of their elders.'
Professor Jespersen goes back to individuals. He does not rely
upon the "mentally homogeneous throng," either for the origin

of human utterance or for the creation of new language stocks.7
I Professor Jespersen is right, I think, in detaching primitive musical utterance from inevitable association with the dance. Edward Sapir (Language,
1921, p. 244) repeats-rather unthinkingly, I believe-the old view that
"Poetry is everywhere inseparable in its origins from the singing voice and the

measure of the dance." Poetry and song are inseparable in origins; butprimitive

musical utterance appears (like the songs of birds or of children) independent
of the dance, as well as associated with it, as far down in the cultural scale as
we can go.

6 Following the American ethnologist Hale, "Tbe Origin of Language,"
in Transactions of the American Association for the Advancement of Science,
vol. xxxv, 1886, etc. See Jespersen's Language, p. 181.
7A parallel shift of theory may be seen in the fields of economics, anthropology, and sociology. For example, a belief prevailed, as advocated by Sir
Henry Maine, E. de Laveleye, and other scholars, that the existing institution

of private property is a direct descendant of a system of communal ownershipmuch as Professor Gummere thought individual authorship and ownership of

song to be the direct descendant of communal authorship and ownership. A

late reflection of Maine's view may be found in The Evolution of Revolution,
by H. M. Hyndman (1921), who writes at the opening of his first chapter
("Primitive Communism"): "All authorities are agreed that, throughout the
earlier development of mankind, communism, without any private property
whatever in the means of creating wealth, prevailed as an economic and social
order" . . . "Private ownership in any shape which gave its possessor economic
or social -power over his fellows, was unknown." Hyndman speaks in his
introduction of "the most crucial revolution in the story of human growth"
. . . "This revolution was the transformation from collective or communal
property held by a portion of a tribe or gens, by the tribe itself, and ultimately

by a confederation of tribes, into private property held by the individual and
his family."
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Alongside the early nineteenth century conceptions of the

growth of law and language belongs Herder's collectivistic
conception of the origin of popular poetry, which his disciple,
F. A. Wolf, afterward applied to the Homeric poems. For
literature, too, communal inspiration was advocated. The

belief became orthodox that primitive peoples and other
mentally homogeneous groups created their songs in public, in
a sort of communal spontaneity. Just as for language, a

distinction was insisted upon between "art" poetry, coming
from the individual, and "folk poetry," arising from the people.
Among English dissenters, Joseph Jacobs remarked that there

is no such thing as the folk behind what one calls folk tales,

folk lore, popular ballads.8 William Wells Newell, founder and
first president of the American Folk-Lore Society was another
dissenter from the doctrine of folk-origins or folk creation.
But the view of these men did not become the accepted view.

"We search for poetry before the poet,"9 said a leading scholar.
"Poetry of the people is made by any given race through the
Some recent studies of the subject of primitive ownership appear to show
that the communistic theory is mythical, not only for private property but for
the ownership of land. Completer investigation makes clear that individualistic
ownership both preceded and followed common control and ownership. This

is the thesis of Jan St. Lewinski (The Origin of Property, Lectures delivered
at the London School of Economics, 1913) who maintains that individual
ownership was always the first form of property . . . "from a state of no
property, individual ownership generally originates once labor has been incorporated in the soil" (p. 22). Pure nomads and hunting peoples have no
private property in land, but land is not common 'property among them.
It is merely a free good, to appropriate which is not worth the trouble. The
evidence of existing primitive peoples, says Lewinski, shows clearly that the
village community was not the primitive stage but was preceded by individual
appropriation. "Thus the principal pillars of the communistic theory are
already demolished!" he writes (p. 30). Private property in personal effects,
like clothes, weapons, domestic animals (in songs, also, it might be added)
prevails everywhere, it appears, even among the peoples lowest in the cultural
scale, and it has probably existed from time immemorial. For a recent American
book, taking the same position as Lewinski's, see Robert H. Lowie, Primitive
Society (1920), chapter IX.

8 "Yet when we come to realize what we mean by saying a custom, a tale,
a myth, arose from the Folk, I fear we must come to the conclusion that the
said Folk is a fraud, a delusion, a myth.... The Folk is a name for our
ignorance." Folk Lore, iv, 234, June, 1893.

9 F. B. Gummere, "The Ballad and Communal Poetry," Harvard Studies
and Notes in Philology and Literature, V, 55.
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same mysterious process which forms speech, cult, myth,
custom, or law."'"
At the present time, however, continental Europe, from which
the doctrine of communal inspiration emerged, has given it up.
Its strongest remaining foothold is in the United States, the
country into which the doctrine last entered.

The whole theory of a communal mind from which emerged
law and institutions and from which on festal occasions are

(or were) born language and literature rests upon the romantic
enterprise of sociologists, who thought to write a psychology of
men en masse apart from any sane reliance upon the analysis of
individual minds-very much as if one were to endeavor to cut

a physical robe foi mankind as a whole with no thought of
individual arms and legs. This effort issued in the bizarre

belief in a collective soul which is not to be found in the nature of
the souls of the individuals which compose the social group, but

which in some mystic sense enwraps the individuals in its allobscuring fog. Such a "communal mind" or "mob mind" or
"'gesammtgeist," as you may choose to call it, has no actuality
which science or sense can observe. If history and indeed
ethnology betray clearly one fact it is that there is no such

"'mental homogeneity" among men. As a critical hypothesis the
whole communal prepossession has led mainly into misconception and misvaluation; its service (for service of a sort it is)
has been to arouse an interest and an industry in its support

which have only succeeded in demonstrating its futility. In
other words, it is honorably shelved by its own inability to
stand the test of substantial evidence.
But in this connection it ought to be in place to point out that
there is another and classical concept in criticism which might

well have its value restored. The consensus gentium, meaning

the critical agreement of instructed opinion, is an idea which in
law underlies all theories of government which proceed ex
communi consensu and in the arts is regarded by Aristotle and

Longinus as well as by the best of Renaissance critics as the
securest anchorage of valuations in matters of taste." It is

10 Old English Ballads, p. xxxvi. For a recent German view, taking the
contrary position concerning the genesis of folk-song, see Alfred Gotze, Vom
Deutschen Volkslied, 1921.

11 The argument from universal consent (consensus omniumn gentiusm) is
formulated by Aristotle at the very beginning of the Topics (i, 1): "As for
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needless to point out that such a conception is poles remote from
the romantic Volksgeist figment. Where the "mob soul" calls
for the play of unconsciousness, the classical consensus calls for
deliberate and trained conscious effort; where "communalism"
seeks formlessly to express feeling, the consensus judges (as
Rousseau has it) in the "calm of the passions";'2 and where the
probable truths, they are such as are admitted by all men, or by the generality
of men, or by wise men; and among these last either by all the wise, or by the
generality of the wise, or by such of the wise as are of the highest authority."

The argument, however, was especially adopted by the Stoics, whose literature
it pervades, and given Latin form by such Stoic writers as Cicero (cf. De
Natura Deoruin, i. 17; ii. 2); and Tubsculanae Dispitationes i. 15: ("quod si om-

nium consensus vox naturae est") and Seneca. Bacon, with the example of
excessive deference to the authority of Aristotle before him, remarks: "Verus
enim consensus is est, qui ex libertate judicii in idem conveniente consistit"

(Instauratio Magno, Pars II, Liber i, Aph. lxxvii). As used in criticism, the
evidence of the consensus of trained minds is regarded as especially valid as the

natural answer to the mediaeval maxim, de gustibus et coloribus non est disputandum; and it is, in fact, the bulwark of any theory of sound criticism in art

and letters. Here again the foundation of the idea is in Aristotle,-both in the

Politics and the Poetics, especially Chapter XXVI of the latter work, where he
defines the higher art as in every case that which appeals to the better auditor, or

the cultivated spectator (OEam's EbMEIKoS); see, also, Butcher, Aristotle's Theory
of Poetry and Fine Art, Ch. IV). But the locus classicus of the idea, in this

critical sense, is without doubt Longinus, De Sublimitaite vii, where he defines
the true test of elevation in letters as the judgment of a man of intelligence,
versed in letters: 'true beauty and sublimity please always and please all.'

Compare also Courthope, Life in Poetry, Law in Taste, I. Of course, in all this

the judicial rather than the creative mind is in regard; but can there be any
valuable creation without selective judgment? Can art, in other words, begin
without at least the impulse of conscious intention, as the mob-soul theories

imply that it does? Perhaps if the phrase "work of art" were refocussed in

critical thought, with right emphasis upon the wor,k, we should have less vogue
of sociological puerilities and more respect for the classics of critical theory.
12 In the first version of the Contrat Social (Livre I, Chapitre II) Rousseau

says: "que la volonte gennrale soit dans chaque individu un acte pur de l'entendement qui raisonne dans le silence des passions sur que l'homme peut

exiger de son semblable, et sur ce que son semblable en droit d'exiger de lui, nul
n'en disconviendra." In view of the fact that to no light degree upon Rousseau

has been fathered the whole chute of modern thought which has ended in the
mire of sociological mysticism, it is of no small interest to note how pains-

takingly intellectualistic Rousseau intended to be. No doubt his "moi commun"
is in part at least the hapless progenitor of our modern Vollsgeister, communal

selves, and mob souls; but when (De l'economie politique) he employed the
analogy of an animal body to define the functions of the body politic, and

likened the life of the whole to a "moi commun," he was actually on classical
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primitivist seeks to replace human thought by dancing puppets

the critic of the tradition endeavors to single out, from the
midst of puppetdom, creative human intelligences. Obviously,
conscious effort, cool judgment, and creative intelligence are

gifts of men, not of mobs; and it was perhaps too much to
expect from a romantic century interest in these qualities.'3
II. THE TERM "COMMUNAL" AND FOLK-SONG

Although the doctrine of communal inspiration played a

large role during the nineteenth century in theories of the
growth of law and language and of other human institutions, the
word "communal" itself was little used in many of these fields.

It came into the foreground chiefly in anthropology, sociology,

psychology, and literature.'4 In American criticism, the term
ground and employing a Platonic figure. It is worth while, however, to point

to a very interesting alteration of phraseology between the first draft and the
final form of the key passage to the Contrat Social which of itself appears to

indicate that Rousseau half feared the very misinterpretation which his phrase
has been given. He defines the terms of the theoretical contract: "Chacun de
nous met en commun sa volonte, ses biens, sa force, at sa personne, sous la
direction de la volonte generale, et nous recevons tous en corps chaque membre
comme partie inalienable du tout." He then, in the first form, continues: "A

l'instant, au lieu de la personne particuliDre de chaque contractant, cet acte
d'association produit un corps moral et collectif, compose d'autant de membres

que l'assemblee a de voix, et auquel le moi commun donne l'unit6 formelle, la
vie et la volonte." In the final version the last phrase is altered to "lequel

[corps moral et collectif] reCoit de ce m6me acte son unite, son moi commun, sa
vie et sa volonte." The subordination of the "moi commun" is obviously the
intention of the change. Of course Rousseau never dreamed of the "overindividual ego" or of the "blind will" of a psychic underworld which were later
to miscolor critical judgment.

13 I am indebted for assistance in my examination of material from the fields
of law, sociology, and philosophy to my brother, Dean Roscoe Pound of the
Harvard Law School, to J. E. Le Rossignol, Professor of Economics at the

University of Nebraska, and especially to H. B. Alexander, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Nebraska.

14 The word communal is as old as the Song of Roland (uit en sunt communel,
in the sense of tous y prennent part, 1. 475, cited by Littr6). Later it usually
denotes what has to do with a commune. As a critical term in English it belongs

to the nineteenth century. Impetus was given to commune after the title was
assumed by Parisian political desperadoes during the Reign of Terror. The

word communal entered English through French influence, early in the century,
in the sense of pertaining to a commune. By the middle of the century it was in
use in the sense of pertaining to a community.
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has its most frequent use in connection with discussions of

traditional ballads. Its currency has not derived from Pro-

fessor Child, who preferred "popular." Professor Child speaks
of "popular" ballads and "popular" origins. It was introduced

by Professor Francis B. GummereU6 in his edition of the Old
English Ballads (1894). When seeking for a differentiating
epithet for the English traditional ballads he writes:16
As a mere makeshift, however, one might use the word "communal." A
communal ballad is a narrative ballad of tradition which represents a community

or folk, not a section or class of that community, and not a single writer.

If, after introducing the term, he had employed it always in
this sense, his usage would better bear examination. But he
soon went far beyond this original definition. He came to
employ the word not only for denoting what "represents" a
community and does not come from a single hand, but for
what a community as over against an individual has created, on

social occasions. He makes spontaneous communal creation,

not gradual re-creation by a succession of singers, a test of
origins. Folk-poetry originates communally, he affirms,

artistic poetry is created by individuals. His disciples have
continued his usage; and by our own time the term has become
pretty firmly entrenched in textbooks and literary histories.

Few American scholars write of folk poetry in these days withou t
relying upon the word.
The following are some conceptions associated with the

term "communal" which I think invalid. It seems probable to
me that they will eventually be given up in America, as they are

now abandoned in continental Europe.
1. It is no more a demonstrated fact that poetry had com-

munal origin than it is that language had such origin, or law, or
u Behind his employment of "communal" lay German influence. He wished
to make for English a distinction similar to that afforded by Franz B6hme's

volkslieder and volksthi4mliche lieder (Liederbuch, 1877). Gummere's "communal
mind" suggests Wundt's volksseele, or his gesammtgeist. He may also have had
in mind Steinthal's dichtender volksgeist, or Lachmann's gemeinsames dichten.
He comments on these terms at some length in the introduction to his Old

English Baallds, and in "The Ballad and Communal Poetry," in the Child
Memorial volume of Harvard Studies and Notes in Philology and Literature.
Otto Immisch (Die innere Entwickelung des griechischen Epos, 1904) coins the
name Gemeinschaftsdichung.

'eOld English Ballads, p. xxvii.
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that property was originally owned in common. Assumptions
like Professor Gummere's "The original ballad must have been
sung by all as it was danced by all,"'7 or "Poetry was a com-

munal product," are assumptions and nothing more. Investigation of the song of primitive peoples shows that primitive

song is not always danced; that primitive lyrics are not narrative
and hence should be termed songs not ballads; and that they
are not necessarily nor even preponderatingly of social inspiration. Communal inspiration should no longer be over-insisted

upon for primitive song. Songs composed by individuals and
songs sung by groups of singers are found among the most
primitive of living races. The conception of individual song
can be shown to exist among the very lowest peoples. That in

the earliest stage there was group utterance merely, arising
from the folk-dance, and that individual composition came
later is fanciful hypothesis. The communal authorship and
ownership of primitive poetry as over against culture poetry is
largely a myth.'8 "Communal" inspiration of poetry is true in
the same sense in primitive as in civilized communities and

only in the same sense.'9
2. It is also erroneous to assume that peasant communities
originate their own ballads or narrative songs. The product of
folk-improvisation is not typically the ballad but the song, and
17 Old English Ballads, p. lxxxvii.
18 The best instance of communal composition among the Indians which I
can cite is the following, which was recently brought to my attention. The

paragraph is from Frances Densmore's "Northern Ute Music" (1922) p. 26, a
volume issued as Bulletin 76 of the Publications of the American Bureau of
Ethnology.

Composition of Songs.-It was said by several singers that they "heard a
song in their sleep," sang it, and either awoke to find themselves singing it
aloud or remembered it and were able to sing it. No information was obtained
on any other method of producing songs. In this connection the writer desires
to record an observation on musical composition among the Sioux. A song was
sung at a gathering and she remarked: "That is different from any Sioux song
I have ever heard, it has so many peculiarities." The interpreter replied,
"That song was composed recently by several men working together. Each
man suggested something and they put it all together in the song." This is the
only instance of cooperation in the composition of an Indian song that has been
observed, adds Miss Densmore.
l8Evidence supporting this and the following generalizations has been
presented by me in various articles published in the Publications of the Modern
Language Association, Modern Language Notes, etc.
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song so produced is the most ephemeral type of song. The
folk improvise largely to familiar airs.20 They do not create

their own melodies, and especially not on the spur of the
moment. They make over, or add stanzas to, or somehow

manipulate, something already in existence. The typical
products of folk-improvisation are the lampoon, the satire, the

adaptation. This was well illustrated by the improvisations of
groups of singing soldiers during the recent war. It has often

been pointed out that in the Southern Appalachians exist
isolated communities, unlettered and cut off for a hundred
years from traffic with the rest of the world; and these communities still entertain themselves with traditional song.

Conditions are ideal for the creation of communal ballads,

according to the orthodox theory. Yet their investigators have
not found that they have any body of song of their own creation,
whether pure lyrics or ballads. They still sing the English and
Scottish ballads brought over by their ancestors.2" Self-created
songs about their own life are conspicuously wanting. The
Southwestern cowboys perhaps live as communal a life as any

in our period; possibly they are more literate than the mountaineers, but they are little more creative. The bulk of their
songs entered their circles from the outside world. Where
they have songs concerning themselves, they are fitted to

familiar melodies, and (at least the songs which have value or

memorableness) are adaptations of already existent material.
The best cowboy songs, having claim to originality, may be
traced to minor poets. The cowboy songs which are nearest to

genuine communal creations are those of weakest quality, are
not narrative, and are in character most ephemeral.22
20 The extent to which old airs are preserved is quite astonishing. Many of
our current hymns and popular songs are set to century-old melodies-originally
made for songs of quite another character.
21 See Olive Dame Campbell and Cecil J. Sharp, English Folk Songs from the
Southern Appalachians, 1917.
A critic who has recently reaffirmed belief in the emergence of the English

and Scottish ballad type from the unschooled peasantry is Professor G. H.
Gerould, Mod. Philol. xxi, August, 1923.
21 The orthodox contemporary American conception of the spontaneous,
gregarious composition of the English and Scottish traditional ballads, on social

occasions, may be imustrated by the familiar picture (Introd. to the Cambridge
edition of the English and Scottish Ballads, 1904) of a plausible method of

composition of "The Hangman's Tree," or of some remote ancestor of it, by a
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3. Another familiar doctrine that needs qualification or
rejection is the doctrine that "communal" ("traditional" is the

better term) preservation of a song brings improvement in the

narrative quality of the song. This is a fundamental belief

with Professor Gummere, and on it he bases his theory of
origins. It is true that there is sometimes improvement in
scattered instances. Ballads both gain and lose in oral trans-

mission. When a later text of a song in popular tradition is
compared with the original text, the dramatic quality is often
found to be enhanced by the omission of stanzas and of links in
homogeneous group; or, to go to a more recent book, by the picture of the
composition of "Sir Patrick Spens" in Greenlaw, Elson, and Keck's Literature
and Life, Book I, p. 237 (1922):

" .... imagine that you are one of a group of people who have been
powerfully moved by the tragic fate of Sir Patrick. You knew him or some of
his men. In this group the tragedy is being discussed. One man says he heard

that Sir Patrick suspected the hand of an enemy, but that he was too brave to
draw back even though he knew that the voyage meant death. Another says
that an old sailor observed portents and omens and promised a tragic outcome.
A third adds that such omens ought never to be disregarded. Others wonder

how the wives and sweethearts of the dead sailors felt when they heard the news,
and they speak of the unutterable sadness of their waiting at home, for tidings.
And at last some one speaks of the dead men themselves, lying down there

fifty fathoms under the sea, their dead eyes open, their bodies gently rolling
from side to side with the motion of the water, or too far below the surface ever
to move. You see you have, in reality, a succession of broken bits of talk,
expressions of mood, not a story told in an orderly way or written up for the
newspaper. One member of the group and then another adds his bit. There
are moments of silence between. All are thinking of the horror, and deeply
moved. Then perhaps one, or two, or three, begin to put the thing into words.
The words fit some simple song that everyone knows. The group begins to
sing the song. The ballad is born.

Thus the ballad seems not to be a story at all but just the expression of the
feelings of a whole group of people. It differs from the story in that it seems to
tell itself. It is not the work of an author who gives to the events an interpretation or who carefully chooses details so that a definite impression is built up in
the mind of the reader. It expresses the reactions of a group. It is impersonal.
It is a tale telling itself."

There is a conspicuous lack of evidence for the typical composition of ballads
in such a way, anywhere, or at any time, even among primitive peoples; and it
it is difficult to show that it is a method of composition that is psychologically
plausible. Yet nearly all the available ballad anthologies for schools (see W. D.
Armes, xxxviii ff.; Neilson and Witham, xv and footnote; G. H. Stempel, xxvii
ff., etc.) paint for their readers this manner of composition for the English and
Scottish ballads.
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the story and the retention only of what is absolutely essential.

There may also be gain in compactness, in singableness, and in
concreteness of diction. A few examples have been cited to the

present writer by the British collector of folk-song, Cecil J.

Sharp, where the melodies of songs have improved in popular
preservation. And occasional instances can be brought up, as
already remarked, where individual texts show improvement.

But, as a principle, the doctrine does not hold. Individual
texts may grow better here and there for a time, especially in
the mouths of superior singers. But a single text of a ballad is

not the ballad itself. While one text is improving another may

be degenerating. Professor Child was right when he said that
the ballad is at its best "the earlier it is caught and fixed in
print."23 And in the long run, even the text which has improved
falls into decay. A traditionally preserved text is not static, and
there is no permanent incorporation into its multiple variants, of
improvements which may arise. At best there is betterment,
through so-called communal preservation, only for sporadic texts

and for a limited extent of time. The typical process, for the
great majority of traditional ballads is a process of decay.
4. The belief that the pattern or technique of the English
and Scottish ballad derives from a pattern set in remote times by

a singing dancing throng improvising communally is all that
remains among certain thinkers of the nineteenth century

communal theory. But even this remainder of that theory
does not deserve the support which it receives. The refrains,
salient situations, repetitions and commonplaces of style
appearing in many ballads (these are the features which are

traced to primitive times) need no such prehistoric derivation;

nor are they such fundamental differentiae of the ballad technique as is commonly assumed. They are easily to be accounted

for in the same ways as for other species of folk-song exhibiting
them which are not termed ballads. The songs of primitive
groups improvising on festal occasions and the ballads appearing

in historic times among civilized peoples do not belong in the
same framework, and they should be kept distinct. Taken
down in a straight line to modern times, the songs of primitive
23 See W. M. Hart, "Professor Child and the Ballad," P. A?. L. A. XXI
(1906), 770, 805, etc.
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festal groups bring us, on the improvisation side, to modern
folk-improvisations, like those of singing soldiers, not an extinct
type of folk-song, though not one of much frequency nor one

bringing very valuable product. Taken down to historic times
on the movement side, the primitive group songs bring us to
the ring-dance or movement or game songs which still exist

among us, songs in which the refrain is the essential feature.

But neither of these varieties of folk-song, the group improvisation song or the dance or game song centering about a refrain,
is identical with the story-song or ballad, and neither variety
develops into the ballad. The narrative song is an independent
lyric type, and it first appears, not among primitive peoples, but

in historic times and among civilized peoples. All races,
primitive or civilized, have folk-songs, but not all have an

important body of ballad poetry. The richness in ballads of
the popular poetry of England and Denmark is not typical
but unusual.

5. Further, it is surely time that definition of the lyric species,
ballad, as "of communal composition" should be given up.24
At least, such composition should be brought forward as hypothetical, not as a demonstrated fact. It is not a valid assumption, even for that single species of ballad, the traditional folk

ballad. Remarks such as Professor Gummere's "A ballad
must be the outcome and expression of a whole community

and this community must be homogeneous"24 are not warranted
by the evidence. This homogeneity is a myth. It is a myth for

mediaeval times, as Chaucer realized when he differentiated the
types of tales which he placed in the mouths of the Canterbury

pilgrims. Even in Anglo-Saxon England, with its clearly

marked class divisions of ax6elingas, eorlas, ceorlas, ltas, ieowas,
there was no time when "society from king to peasant" had

identical interests. And even the songs of primitive peoples do
not originate as "the outcome and expression of the whole
community." It is also misleading to associate the term "com-

munal" invariably with the ballad, ignoring other lyric species
which deserve the term (however they may have originated)
far more than does the ballad, i.e., hymns, labor songs, student
24 Old English Ballads, p. xxvii. A recent critic who reaffirms belief in the
homogeneous throng and communal origins is Professor H. S. V. Jones, Jouwnal
of English and Germanic Philology, vol. xxii, January, 1923.

THE TERM "COMMUNAL" 453

songs, game songs. The term has attached itself to ballads;
yet it should not be emphasized as something which differentiates ballads. Indeed, those who discuss ballads are

much given to confusing several kinds of song which properly
should be carefully distinguished. These kinds are: (1) Folkimprovisations, a type of verse which appears among all peoples,
at all stages of development, from primitive gatherings to folkgatherings (like those of soldiers) in our own day.25 But this

type of verse is not very durable or very important. The
product of the folk-improvisations of the illiterate, in particular,
has been rated far too high; (2) Genuine traditional game or
ring-dance songs, or dance songs proper, like those (many of

them once danced to by grown-ups) traditional in children's
games; and (3) Lyric-epics, or ballads proper, a type appearing
in England some centuries after the Norman Conquest and
attaining its height in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
It is partly because folk-improvisations lack story form, and
because genuine dance songs of traditional preservation aye not

narrative, that such origin is to be doubted for the English and
Scottish lyric-epics collected by Professor Child. According

to all the evidence to be found, neither folk-improvisation nor
folk-dancing has ever produced narrative song, or any other
kind of song which is worth much poetically.

6. Lastly, even when we speak of "communal re-creation"
rather than communal creation of ballads, we are using the

term without real accuracy. There is re-creation by individual
hands of songs in popular tradition, but is this truly "communal?" One singer in a community makes one set of changes,
another makes another set. Indeed the same singer does not

always sing a song in the same way, or with the same words.
The changes are not the product of a gesammtgeist. There is no
communal text; there are many shifting texts in the mouths of

many singers. The term "communal" is without real validity
even when we use it, not of the creation of ballads, but of their

re-creation or modification.
25 Here, and not under the classification "ballads," belongs the "Hinkie
Dinkie" of Mr. Atcheson L. Hench ("Communal Composition of Ballads in the
A. E. F.," Journal of American Folk-Lors, vol. 34, p. 386).
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The conclusion to be drawn from the preceding considerations

is that, on the whole, literary historians and makers of textbooks, would do well to give less conspicuous place to the now

hopelessly misused term "communal" in discussions of balladry
and folk-song, in the hope that this omission might generate in
them a new temper when theorizing concerning poetic origins.
They should also cease to derive the ballad from the "homo-

geneous throng" whether of mediaeval peasantry or of primitive
tribes. A doctrine of inspiration which is now discarded in

other fields should not linger with belated tenacity in literary
criticism. Professor Child exhibited characteristic soundness of
judgment when he preferred the terms "popular" and "traditional"-by far the safer terms- and when he remarked of the
English and Scottish ballads that "a man and not a people
has composed them," and that "the ballad is not originally the
product or the property of the common orders of people."26
LOUISE POUND
N Johnson's Cyclopaedia, article "Ballads."

